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Civil Appeal No. 25 of 2010

M/S Sopa Management Limited v M/S Tanzania Revenue Authority

Judgement Court of Appeal of Tanzania Stamp Duty 2010

Summary of Judgment

Facts

In Civil Case No. 22 of 1998, the High Court (Mushi, J.) struck out the suit for want of jurisdiction to determine matters relating to hotel levy, sales tax, stamp duty and car benefit imposed on the appellant, SOPA Management Ltd., by the Tanzania Revenue Authority (the respondent), with costs awarded to the respondent. Three and a half years later, the respondent, as decree holder, lodged a Taxation Cause (Bill of Costs) totaling Tshs 514,753,580/= for the costs of the struck-out suit. The appellant's advocate raised a preliminary objection that the Taxation Cause was time barred. The Taxing Master upheld the objection. The respondent then sought a Reference to the High Court to quash the Taxing Master's ruling. Chocha, J. held that the Bill of Costs fell under item 20 of the First Schedule, Part III of the Law of Limitation Act, 1971 (limitation period of 12 years, applicable to enforcement of a judgment, decree or order), and ordered that the Taxation Cause proceed on merit. The appellant, dissatisfied, appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Issues

The central issue was whether the Bill of Costs filed by the respondent was time barred under the Law of Limitation Act, 1971 — specifically, which item of the First Schedule, Part III governed the limitation period applicable to a bill of costs: item 20 (12 years, for enforcement of a judgment, decree or order) or item 21 (sixty days, for applications under written law for which no other period of limitation is provided).

Arguments

The appellant, through Mr. Maro, argued that a bill of costs is not part of the decree and does not constitute an application for execution or enforcement of a judgment; rather, it is an application to determine the costs of litigation, filed separately from the decree. Since the Limitation Act does not specifically provide a limitation period for bills of costs, such applications fall under item 21 of the First Schedule (sixty days), and since the Bill of Costs was filed three and a half years after the judgment, it was time barred. The appellant relied on commentaries by B.B. Mitra and M.R. Mallick on the Indian Limitation Act and on McGee's Commentaries on Limitation Periods to stress the policy rationale for limitation periods. The respondent, through Dr. Mapunda, contended that the Bill of Costs fell under item 20 of the First Schedule (12 years), as it was akin to enforcing a judgment, decree or order of the court, and that the preliminary objection was misconceived, novel, unprecedented and without merit. Notably, before the Court of Appeal, both counsel conceded that there is no specific period of limitation prescribed for filing a Bill of Costs for taxation, and that the matter would fall under either item 20 or item 21 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1971.

Holding

The Court of Appeal held that although a bill of costs is linked to the decree (in that a decree holder is entitled to costs where there is no order withholding them), a bill of costs is instituted separately as an application to determine the costs of litigation, and is not itself an application to enforce a judgment, decree or order. Since the Law of Limitation Act, 1971 does not provide a specific limitation period for lodging a bill of costs, such an application falls under item 21 of the First Schedule, Part III, which prescribes a limitation period of sixty days for applications under written law for which no period is otherwise provided. The Court found that the learned High Court judge erroneously reversed the decision of the Taxing Master by applying item 20 (12 years) instead of item 21 (60 days). Accordingly, the Court quashed and set aside the High Court's decision, restored the ruling of the Taxing Master, and held that the Bill of Costs in Taxation Cause No. 13 of 2004 was time barred. The appeal was allowed with costs.

Significance

The judgment clarifies that, under the Tanzanian Law of Limitation Act, 1971, a bill of costs is a distinct application from the underlying decree and does not attract the 12-year limitation period applicable to enforcement of judgments, decrees or orders under item 20 of the First Schedule. Instead, absent any specific limitation provision for bills of costs, the residual sixty-day limitation period under item 21 applies. This establishes a clear precedent for classifying taxation/bill of costs applications for limitation purposes, emphasizing that such applications must be filed promptly after judgment rather than being treated as part of the broader enforcement process, thereby reinforcing the policy rationale for limitation periods discussed in the submissions—namely the need for certainty, evidentiary reliability, and diligence by litigants in enforcing their rights.

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