Civil Reference No. 7 of 2004
Mbeya Inter Trade Company Ltd appealed to the Court of Appeal of Tanzania against a decision of the Tax Revenue Appeals Tribunal (Shangwa, J.) delivered in Income Tax Appeal No. 6 of 2004. At the hearing of the appeal, the Respondent's advocate, Mr. Beleko, raised a preliminary objection, notice of which had been lodged earlier under Rule 100 of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1979. The objection was that the decree appended to the record of appeal had been signed by the Registrar of the Tribunal rather than by the Judge (Chairman) of the Tribunal, and that this rendered the appeal incompetent for non-compliance with Order XX Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code (Cap 33 R.E. 2002) and Rule 89(1)(h) of the Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules, 1979.
Whether a decree appealed against, which was signed by the Registrar of the Tax Revenue Appeals Tribunal instead of by the Judge who determined the appeal, complies with Order XX Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code and Rule 89(1)(h) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1979, and, if not, whether such non-compliance renders the appeal incompetent.
For the Respondent, Mr. Beleko argued that the decree was invalid because it was signed by the Registrar of the Tribunal and not by the Judge/Chairman who decided the matter, contrary to Order XX Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code and Rule 89(1)(h) of the Court of Appeal Rules. He relied on the precedent of Tanzania Revenue Authority v Njake Enterprises Limited, Civil Appeal No. 122 of 2004 (unreported), and on section 25(2) of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act 2006, which provides that appeals to the Court of Appeal lie only on questions of law and that the Appellate Jurisdiction Act and its rules apply mutatis mutandis. He urged the Court to strike out the appeal as incompetent.
For the Appellant, Mr. Kulanga (the company's Director) opposed the preliminary objection, submitting that the decree was valid because the requirements of Order XX Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code did not apply in the circumstances. He contended that the preliminary objection had no basis and should be dismissed.
The Court upheld the preliminary objection and struck out the appeal with costs. It held that the law relating to decrees under Order XX Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code mandatorily requires a decree to be signed by a Judge or Magistrate, a position confirmed by prior decisions of the Court, including Robert Mugo (Administrator of the Estate of the late John Mugo) v Adam Mollel, Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1990, Tanzania Revenue Authority v Njake Enterprises Limited, Civil Appeal No. 122 of 2004, and Ndwaty Philomen Ole Saibul v Solomon Ole Saibul, Civil Appeal No. 68 of 1998, which explained that this requirement ensures the deciding Judge can verify the decree accords with the judgment. Since the decree in the record of appeal was signed by the Registrar rather than the Judge/Chairman of the Tribunal, it was defective and did not satisfy the essential requirement under Rule 89(1)(h) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1979. Consequently, the decree was invalid, rendering the appeal incompetent.
The ruling reaffirms the strict, mandatory requirement under Order XX Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code that a decree must be signed by the Judge or Magistrate who decided the matter, and applies this requirement to decrees emanating from the Tax Revenue Appeals Tribunal by virtue of section 25(2) of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act, which imports the Appellate Jurisdiction Act and its rules mutatis mutandis. It confirms that a decree is an essential document for purposes of Rule 89(1)(h) of the Court of Appeal Rules, and that a defect in its signing—such as signature by a Registrar instead of the deciding Judge—renders an appeal incompetent and liable to be struck out. The decision follows and consolidates a consistent line of Court of Appeal authority on this procedural requirement.
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