Civil Reference No. 7 of 2004
The Tax Revenue Appeals Tribunal delivered judgment against the applicant, Insignia Limited, on 15 September 2006. The applicant, aggrieved by the decision, filed a notice of appeal on 25 September 2006. It then wrote to the Registrar of the Tribunal requesting copies of the proceedings, judgment and decree for appeal purposes. The decree was only supplied on 7 December 2006, by which time the applicant's advocate alleged that the sixty-day period within which to file an application for stay of execution had already elapsed. On 8 December 2006 the applicant wrote to the Registrar seeking a certificate of delay, relying on the established practice that a copy of the decree sought to be stayed must be annexed to an application for stay of execution. The applicant thereafter applied, under Rule 8 of the Court of Appeal Rules, for an extension of time to file an application for stay of execution, attributing the delay solely to the Registrar's twenty-three day delay in supplying the decree.
(1) Whether there is a statutory or binding sixty-day time limit applicable to applications for stay of execution, such that the applicant's application could be said to be time-barred. (2) Whether the applicant demonstrated 'sufficient reason' under Rule 8 of the Court of Appeal Rules to justify an extension of time to file its application for stay of execution.
The applicant, through its advocate's affidavit, argued that the delay in filing the application for stay of execution was solely caused by the Registrar's late supply of the decree (delivered 23 days after the point at which the sixty-day period had allegedly run out), and that this constituted sufficient reason under Rule 8. It relied on the established practice requiring a copy of the decree to be annexed to a stay application, and cited Suleman Ally Nyamalegi & Others v Mwanza Engineering Works Limited (a single-judge decision purportedly setting a sixty-day limit) as support that time limits apply to such applications. The respondent's advocate, Mr Beleko, conceded the cause of the delay (i.e., did not dispute that the decree was supplied late) but argued that the applicant had not acted with due dispatch and had not shown sufficient reason to merit the grant of an extension of time; no affidavit in reply was filed by the respondent.
The Court (Nsekela, J.A., sitting as a single judge) granted the application for extension of time, directing the applicant to file its application for stay of execution within fourteen days, with costs to be in the cause. The Court held that there is no statutory time limit governing applications for stay of execution; the sixty-day limit referenced by the applicant, as set out in Nyamalegi's case (following Kasuka's case), was intended to apply only to civil applications for review, not to all civil applications, as clarified in Dimon Tanzania Limited v Commissioner General, TRA. The Court agreed with the reasoning in Dimon's case on this point. Even assuming the sixty-day period had expired, the Court found that the applicant had given a valid and sound explanation for the delay (the Registrar's late supply of the decree), the respondent had filed no affidavit in reply and was not prejudiced by the delay, and the delay was not attributable to any dilatory conduct by the applicant. Applying the principle from Shanti v Hindocha & Others (1973) EA 207 that an applicant for extension of time need only show sufficient reason, particularly that the delay was not caused by his own dilatory conduct, and exercising its judicial discretion under Rule 8 based on the circumstances, the Court was satisfied the applicant had discharged this burden.
The ruling clarifies that the sixty-day time limit derived from earlier single-judge decisions (Nyamalegi's case, following Kasuka's case) applies specifically to civil applications for review and not generally to all civil applications, including applications for stay of execution, aligning with the reasoning in Dimon Tanzania Limited v Commissioner General, TRA. It reaffirms the principle from Shanti v Hindocha & Others that an applicant seeking extension of time under Rule 8 need only demonstrate sufficient reason, most persuasively that the delay was not caused by the applicant's own dilatory conduct, without needing to show an arguable case or reasonable prospects of success on the substantive matter. The case also underscores that delay caused by a court registry's failure to timeously supply required documents (such as a decree) can constitute sufficient reason for extension, particularly where the opposing party suffers no prejudice and does not contest the facts by affidavit.
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