On 31 May 2019, the Commissioner General of TRA served Audax Kijana Kameja with an adjusted tax assessment of TZS 402,192,237.10 for the 2010 year of income.
On 7 June 2019, the appellant applied for an extension of time to lodge a notice of objection. While that application was still pending, TRA served him with another demand notice dated 19 July 2019, requiring payment of TZS 379,912,382.10 as adjusted Personal Income Tax for 2010.
On 6 August 2019, the appellant filed a notice of objection together with an application for a full waiver of the requirement to deposit one-third of the assessed tax. He argued that the waiver application was made within the statutory period under Regulation 95 of the Tax Administration (General) Regulations, 2016.
TRA did not determine the waiver application within the period which the appellant argued was prescribed by law. TRA subsequently rejected the waiver application on the ground that it was time-barred.
The appellant appealed to the Tax Revenue Appeals Board (TRAB). However, TRA raised a preliminary objection that the Board had no jurisdiction, because the appeal did not arise from an objection decision.
The Board accepted the preliminary objection and struck out the appeal as premature and incompetent. The Tax Revenue Appeals Tribunal subsequently upheld the Board's decision, relying principally on the Court of Appeal's earlier decisions in Pan African Energy Tanzania Ltd v Commissioner General, TRA (Civil Appeal No. 121 of 2018) and Pan African Energy Tanzania Ltd v Commissioner General, TRA (Civil Appeal No. 172 of 2020).The appellant then appealed to the Court of Appeal.
The principal issue was:
Whether the Tax Revenue Appeals Board had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal arising from TRA's refusal, or alleged omission/delay, to grant a waiver of the requirement to deposit one-third of the assessed tax.
A related issue was:
Whether the appellant's circumstances were distinguishable from the circumstances considered in Pan African Energy I and II, particularly because the appellant characterized TRA's conduct as an "omission" under section 53(1) of the Tax Administration Act, 2015.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal with costs.
The Court held that the Board had no jurisdiction to entertain the appellant's appeal because the matter concerned TRA's refusal to grant a waiver of the one-third tax deposit, and such refusal did not constitute an objection decision capable of being appealed to the Board under the applicable statutory framework.
The Court relied heavily on its previous decisions in Pan African Energy I and II, which had already determined that an appeal to the Board is restricted to an objection decision of the Commissioner General and that refusal to grant a waiver of the one-third tax deposit does not fall within the relevant category of appealable tax decisions.
The Court distinguished between:
an omission, and
a delay in making a decision.
Because TRA eventually made a decision refusing the waiver, the Court held that there was a delay, not an "omission" within section 53(1) of the TAA. The refusal decision itself formed the basis of the appellant's appeal before the Board.
The Court therefore found that the Tribunal was correct to apply stare decisis and follow Pan African I and II.
The case reinforces the principle that jurisdiction cannot be assumed or created by implication. The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal must come from legislation, and the statutory limits of that jurisdiction must be respected.
A taxpayer cannot automatically appeal every adverse administrative action by TRA to the Board. The decision must fall within the category of matters over which the Board has statutory appellate jurisdiction.
This is particularly significant for taxpayers seeking to challenge procedural or interlocutory decisions made during the objection process.
The Court confirmed the position established in Pan African Energy I and II that refusal to waive the statutory tax deposit is not an objection decision for purposes of an appeal to TRAB.
This is one of the most important aspects of the judgment.
The Court made a distinction between:
Failure to make a decision at all = potentially an omission
and
Making the decision late or a delay, is not necessarily an omission.
Here, because TRA ultimately issued a refusal of the waiver, the Court treated the conduct as delay, rather than the statutory "omission" relied upon by the appellant.
The judgment demonstrates the practical force of stare decisis in Tanzanian tax litigation. Once the Court of Appeal had determined the jurisdictional question in Pan African I and II, the Tribunal and Board were bound to follow that interpretation unless the circumstances were materially distinguishable. The Court expressly held that there were no cogent reasons for departing from those earlier authorities.
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